

THE JURY METHOD: HOW THE PERSUADER PERSUADES*

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The "jury method," a technique permitting study of two-person persuasive interaction, is used to examine the natural behavior of the persuader. Investigation of the way in which one subject persuades the other suggests that persuasion is a function, not of intelligence, prediscussion conviction, position with respect to the issue, manifest ability, or volubility, but of the expression of confidence during the discussion itself.

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ASSUME the following concerning person A and person B:
(a) each has read the facts relating to a disputed issue;
(b) each has read but one of two opposing interpretations of the facts; (c) each agrees readily with the interpretation he has read so that A's opinion is opposed to B's. In discussion, A and B are required to resolve their initial disagreement about the issue. How can we predict which person will persuade the other?

No appropriate technique for investigating this question has been available. That is, no method has permitted random assignment of Ss to opposing points of view with respect to an issue and subsequent observation of Ss as they attempt to resolve their disagree-

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ment. Abelson¹ has noted the difficulty, when studying two-person persuasive interaction, of generating "[appropriate] opinion mixes . . . [which] can be continuously elicited, expressed, and measured."

Recently, however, a technique has been developed which allows the study of two-person persuasive interaction.² With minimal influence from sources of attitude formation outside the laboratory, pairs of Ss are manipulated into opposition about an interesting issue. The researcher observes Ss discussing the issue in the process of resolving disagreement.

This technique, the "jury method," addresses itself as well to a second gap in the area of persuasion and attitude change. Work in this field has focused primarily upon the effect of specified variables on the person to be persuaded (who fills the role of "persuadee"). Currently, investigators have only rudimentary knowledge about the natural behavior of a person attempting to persuade (who fills the role of "persuader").³ The present study attempts to gain insight into the psychology of the persuader through use of the jury method.

An experiment⁴ conducted in part to determine the viability of the jury method presented the authors with the problem of how the persuader had changed the attitude of the persuadee. Each of ten pairs of Ss, all of whom had been manipulated into opposition, discussed the same issue and arrived at unanimity. No other manipulation had been introduced into the study. Paired Ss were not substantially different from one another in terms of demographic characteristics. The opposing arguments read by Ss prior to discussion, and which had manipulated them into disagreement, were roughly equal in their logic and persuasive force. Prior to discussion, persuaders and persuadees had been about equally convinced of their respective positions. Study of the tape-recorded discussions did not

¹ R. P. Abelson, "Mathematical Models in Social Psychology," in L. Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. III, New York, Academic Press, 1967.

² H. London, P. J. Meldman, and A. V. C. Lanckton, *The Jury Method*, deposited with the National Auxiliary Publications Service, 1970. Order NAPS Document 00802 from ASIS National Auxiliary Publications Service, c/o CCM Information Sciences, Inc., 909 Third Ave., New York, New York 10022, remitting \$1.00 for microfiche or \$3.00 for photocopies.

³ See, for instance, D. W. Carment, "Participation and Opinion-Change as a Function of the Sex of the Members of Two-Person Groups," *Acta Psychologica*, 1968, Vol. 28, pp. 84-91; D. W. Carment, C. G. Miles, and V. B. Cervin, "Persuasiveness and Persuasibility as Related to Intelligence and Extraversion," *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 1965, Vol. 4, pp. 1-7. Cf. also W. J. McGuire, "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2d ed., Vol. III, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1969, p. 177.

⁴ H. London, P. J. Meldman, and A. V. C. Lanckton, "The Jury Method: Some Correlates of Persuading," *Human Relations*, in press.

reveal that persuaders had more ability to deal articulately with points of logic. How, then, had the persuaders persuaded?

In examining the typed discussions of the study, we began to notice a difference in style between the person persuading and the person being persuaded. The two might make similar, if opposing, substantive points, but they expressed them in contrasting ways. Simply put, persuaders tended to use words expressing confidence, while persuadees used words expressing doubt. On this basis we postulate that expression of the greater "net" confidence during discussion brings about persuasion.⁵

Of course, to propose that the expression of confidence during discussion causes persuasion is obviously not to say that expressed confidence itself has no cause prior to discussion. "Expressed confidence" is a variable which characterizes communication *per se*, independent of its source or its receiver. It must, therefore, be distinguished from other variables such as credibility and self-esteem, which may seem at first glance similar. Within McGuire's terminological scheme, expressed confidence is a *message* variable while credibility is a *source* variable and self-esteem is a *receiver* variable.⁶

In testing the hypothesis that expressed confidence causes persuasion, we present a study in which we deliberately abstain from manipulating that variable. We abstain because we wish to re-create as closely as possible the conditions of the study that led to the hypothesis. We are relatively uninterested in the relation between manipulated confidence and persuasion. One would not be surprised if Ss manipulated to express the confidence of De Gaulle persuaded Ss manipulated to express the diffidence of Caspar Milquetoast. But manipulating expressed confidence and finding that persuasion follows does not solve the problem with which we have been presented.

Suppose, in our analysis of the previous study, we had arrived at the (erroneous) hypothesis that the S who had presented his argument more humbly had persuaded the other. Suppose further that the real cause of persuasion in that study were indeed the expression of confidence. If one were now to carry out a second study in which the independent, manipulated variable were humility, one *might* find humility causing persuasion. Although this hypothetical second

⁵ Cf. H. H. Kelley and J. W. Thibaut, "Group Problem Solving," in Lindzey and Aronson, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁶ W. J. McGuire, "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change," in Lindzey and Aronson, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 172. The question may arise whether expressed confidence should be considered a "message style" or a "message discrepancy" variable (*ibid.*, pp. 207, 217). We prefer at this stage in our research to consider expressed confidence a message style variable, since to consider it a message discrepancy variable implies more than we know about how expressed confidence is perceived.

study would tell us that humility *can* cause persuasion, it tells us *nothing* about what in fact caused persuasion in the original study.

We are now caught in a dilemma. If we manipulate expressed confidence, we cannot answer the question we are asking. But if we attempt to test our hypothesis *without* manipulating, by gathering correlational data, then we run into difficulty inferring causation. Classically, one cannot infer causation from correlational data.

There is, however, a way out of this methodological bind. The logic of inferring causation from correlational data has recently received attention from methodologists in a variety of disciplines.⁷ The strategy suggested is to gather evidence allowing evaluation of a number of alternative causal models. Insofar as the models are reasonably exhaustive of possible explanations, and insofar as one model is supported while the others are not, then one may infer that the supported model is *causally* operative.

Confidence and doubt may, of course, be expressed in a variety of ways. Tone of voice, facial expression, language, posture, all can convey confidence. We have used language as the major index. We do not deny the importance of other indicators, but language is convenient, quantifiable, and perhaps richest as a tool for understanding persuasion. Specifically, we propose that certain of the statements uttered in the course of a discussion express confidence (in terms of statements conveying confidence in self [D_s] and doubt in other [D_o]), and doubt (in terms of statements conveying doubt in self [D_s] and confidence in other [C_o]).

In the course of discussion both person A and person B utter a number of statements relevant to confidence and doubt and a number of statements that are irrelevant. From the relevant statements, for any single participant, we derive a score which may be considered a vector insofar as, being directional, it necessarily represents *both* the persuasive force exerted on the other *and*, simultaneously, the resistance to persuasion of the self.⁸ To compute the vector one sub-

⁷ H. Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research*, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1964; D. T. Campbell and J. C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963; C. C. Li, *Population Genetics*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1955; W. J. McGuire, "Some Impending Reorientations in Social Psychology: Some Thoughts Provoked by Kenneth Ring," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 1967, Vol. 3, pp. 124-139; W. J. McGuire, "Theory-Oriented Research in Natural Settings: The Best of Both Worlds for Social Psychology," in M. Sherif, ed., *Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences*, Chicago, Aldine, 1969; H. A. Simon, *Models of Man*, New York, Wiley, 1957.

⁸ Cf. J. C. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," *American Political Science Review*, 1955, Vol. 49, pp. 431-451, esp. p. 434, fn. 11. Cf. also K. Lewin, *The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces*, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1938.

tracts from the number of statements indicating confidence the number of statements indicating doubt. In other words, one may derive for each discussant a numerical expression of his "vector of persuasion":

$$\text{Vector of Persuasion} = \text{Confidence} - \text{Doubt} = [C_s + D_o] - [D_s + C_o]$$

One can then predict which of two individuals discussing an issue will persuade the other by comparing their vectors. The person with the larger vector will become the persuader; the person with the smaller vector will become the persuadee.

METHOD

Procedure. Pairs of Ss participated in a study involving jury deliberation. Upon arrival at the experimental room, Ss individually read the essentials of a law case, registered prediscussion verdicts, and then discussed the case for fifteen minutes with instructions to reach a unanimous verdict. E tape-recorded the discussion, having informed Ss he was doing so, and, at its conclusion, obtained the post-discussion verdict.

Subjects. The subjects were 36 female summer school students at Boston University. They were paid volunteers and were paired and matched on the basis of age, height, weight, and birth order.

Communications. Subjects received a booklet⁹ which consisted of (a) a fact summary of a dispute between a plaintiff and a defendant, (b) judge's instructions to the jury, and (c) a "legal analysis" of the case. These materials have been summarized in detail elsewhere.¹⁰ Although both Ss received the same fact summary and judge's instructions, intentionally concealed was the fact that each received a different legal analysis of the case. One legal analysis argued for the plaintiff while the other argued for the defendant. These analyses differed, not with respect to the facts of the case, but with respect to the interpretation of the legal consequences of the facts.

Measurement of verdict. Subjects received two-page prediscussion and post-discussion verdict sheets. The first page asked S to indicate his verdict: Whether the defendant *should* or *should not* be held liable for the loss suffered by the plaintiff. The second page asked S to indicate % confidence that the defendant *should* be held liable and also % confidence that the defendant *should not* be held liable. Analysis of prediscussion and post-discussion verdict sheets revealed which S succeeded in persuading the other. The persuader was the

⁹ London, *et al.*, 1970, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ London, *et al.*, in press, *op. cit.*

S whose verdict remained the same after discussion; the persuadee was the S whose verdict changed.

Measurement of the expression of confidence and doubt. It has been postulated that Ss express four kinds of statements relevant to confidence and doubt. Relevant statements express (a) confidence in self [C_s]; (b) doubt in other [D_o]; (c) doubt in self [D_s]; (d) confidence in other [C_o]. A major task lay in devising a method of scoring verbal material for the presence of these four kinds of statements. A scoring manual¹¹ was developed to allow coding of discussions into the pertinent categories. The scoring method is set forth in detail in the manual, and is discussed only briefly here.

The heart of the scoring manual consists of four "dictionaries,"¹² or lists of words and phrases, one dictionary for each of the categories. The dictionaries were developed by intensive examination of jury discussions in the study mentioned earlier.¹³ Jury discussions are tape-recorded and then typed. The scorer codes a typed discussion without knowing which of the two participants has persuaded the other. If a word or phrase in one of the dictionaries is used in a discussion, the scorer codes it into the appropriate category of an interaction analysis sheet, an interaction between persons A and B being defined as a statement by A and an immediately subsequent statement by B.

Let us illustrate the use of the dictionary with reference to A, who, we shall assume, has registered a prediscussion verdict for the plaintiff. If A says, during his discussion with B, "I am *convinced* that the plaintiff should be paid by the defendant," the statement is coded as $C_{s(A)}$. If A says to B, "You are *mistaken*," the statement is coded $D_{o(A)}$. If A says, "I am *confused*," the statement is coded as $D_{s(A)}$. Finally, if A says, "It *favors* your side," the statement is coded as $C_{o(A)}$.

To test reliability, two scorers independently coded four discussions in the present study. These data were then evaluated using a percentage agreement index commonly employed in reporting scoring reliabilities for content analyses.¹⁴ The index was computed by dividing twice the agreements by the sum of the decisions for each S by each coder. One unit of agreement was scored when both coders

¹¹ K. Yoselson, P. J. Meldman, and H. London, *A Scoring Manual of Confidence and Doubt*, deposited with the National Auxiliary Publications Service, 1970. Order NAPS Doc. 00803 as in footnote 2, \$1.00 for microfiche or \$3.00 for photocopies.

¹² Cf. P. J. Stone, D. C. Dunphy, M. S. Smith, and D. M. Ogilvie, *The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis*, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1967.

¹³ London et al., in press, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ J. Atkinson, ed., *Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society*, Princeton, N.J., Van

had decided that either (a) S had uttered a word or expression falling into a particular coding category during his half of an interaction; or (b) S had said nothing falling into any of the four coding categories during his half of an interaction. The resulting figure turned out to be 387/500, or 77.4 per cent.

EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPERIMENTAL SITUATION

Agreement with legal analyses. Twenty-nine of the 36 Ss came to an initial verdict in agreement with the particular legal analysis they had read. Of the 7 Ss who disagreed with their legal analysis, 2 disagreed with the argument for the defendant while 5 disagreed with the argument for the plaintiff. The 7 juries who agreed at the outset are excluded from results reported below.

Awareness of manipulation. Disagreement was manipulated by having paired Ss read different legal analyses of the case to be discussed. To evaluate awareness of this manipulation, one of the post-experimental questions asked:

In order to increase the probability of jury members disagreeing, in half of the juries in this experiment each member received a different legal analysis, one arguing for the plaintiff and one arguing for the defendant. Do you believe that your partner read the same legal analysis you did or that your partner read a different analysis?

To this question Ss were to respond on a fifteen-point scale running from 1 (definitely different) to 15 (definitely the same). The mean response for Ss receiving the argument for the plaintiff was 12.27 while the mean response for Ss receiving the argument for the defendant was 11.64. The difference between these means is statistically trivial. Verbal anchors on the fifteen-point scale indicate that, after discussion of the case, both groups of Ss believed the legal analysis received by their partners was "probably the same" as the legal analysis they had received.

Resolution of opposition. Of the eleven pairs initially opposing one another, all were able to resolve their difference and reach a common verdict by the end of the discussion period.

EVALUATION OF DISCUSSION VARIABLES

We now present evidence allowing evaluation of the leading variables intrinsic to the discussion itself which may explain how one person persuaded the other.

Differential persuasiveness of the legal analyses. It may be that persuasion of one person by the other is simply a function of the legal analysis received. The argument for the plaintiff may, for instance, be so superior to the argument for the defendant that, when

Ss bring these analyses into direct confrontation, the S receiving the plaintiff's argument always persuades his opponent.

The evidence, however, indicates that persuasion is not to be explained on these grounds. Six pairs of Ss decided in favor of the defendant, while five pairs decided in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, we may rule out legal analyses *per se* as causes of persuasion.

Differential ability. Persuasion may possibly be explained in terms of ability. Perhaps the S who more ably articulates and deals with the logical points that arise in the course of discussion persuades the other. What is the evidence relevant to this alternative?

In the first place, since Ss used to a certain extent the arguments of the legal analysis they had received, and since we know that these arguments are not differentially persuasive, the ability hypothesis is rendered somewhat less likely.

Further evidence comes from six law students asked to evaluate discussions in terms of the differential ability manifested by paired Ss. The students, all high-ranking juniors or seniors at the Harvard Law School, were paid for several hours of time spent reading and evaluating the discussions. They were simply asked to indicate, for each discussion, which S was arguing more ably. "Ability" was defined in terms of logic, relevance, appropriate order of presentation of points, coherence of argument, understanding of issues. The law students were asked to exclude from their criteria of ability emotional appeals, the attempt to persuade by the use of such words as "clearly," "obviously," and the like, indications that a subject was winning, and evidence that an S was controlling the social situation *via* force of personality.

The law students could not agree on which of each pair of Ss was arguing more ably. Calculating percentage agreement indices between all possible pairs of student ratings and averaging the results yielded 63 per cent. Agreement will be near the chance level of 50 per cent if the difference in ability judged by the same criteria is small. Thus, assuming that law students can reliably judge the ability manifested in a discussion of a legal issue, the 63 per cent result tends to confirm the conclusion that persuaders were not arguing more ably than persuadees.

Further evidence with respect to differential ability must be deferred until after the expressed confidence hypothesis has been considered.

Differential expressed confidence. For each of the participants in the jury situation, a vector of persuasion can be computed by subtracting the amount of expressed doubt from the amount of expressed confidence. We have postulated that persuaders will have a significantly larger vector than persuadees.

The data are summarized in Table 1. The figures represent means for persuaders and persuadees of instances of C_s, D_s, D_a, and C_a. From these means are computed mean vectors of persuasion. The mean vector for persuaders is 30.6; the mean vector for persuadees is 12.5. A *t*-test of the difference between paired vectors is significant ($p < .01$). This p value and all p values reported in this paper are two tailed.¹⁵

TABLE 1
MEAN VECTOR OF PERSUASION FOR PERSUADERS AND PERSUADEES

Subjects	N	C _s	D _s	D _a	C _a	Vector of Persuasion
						[C _s + D _s] - [D _a + C _a]
Persuaders	11	14.7	19.4	1.8	1.7	30.6
Persuadees	11	11.9	12.7	3.5	8.6	12.5
						$p < .01$

With the expressed confidence hypothesis supported, let us turn to alternative interpretations that may be placed upon this finding. According to one view, the persuader's expression of confidence does not lead to persuasion. Rather, the persuader persuades by virtue of his more able argument, and expressed confidence is a *correlate* of his manifest ability. If the persuader expresses more confidence, this difference arises as a *result* of comparisons made by both persuader and persuadee with respect to their relative abilities. It follows that a sizable difference in expressed confidence will emerge relatively late in the discussion and that the persuader's confidence will increase in magnitude throughout.

The thrust of our hypothesis, on the other hand, is that the expression of confidence from the very outset *causes* persuasion. Expressions of confidence and doubt are not dependent upon assessment of the argument of the other, so that sizable differences should occur quite early in the discussion. Further, the hypothesis does not require that the persuader's vector increase with time. Indeed, a decrease with time is compatible with the hypothesis since a decline might very well signal that, after some point, the persuader no longer finds it necessary to express as much confidence.¹⁶

¹⁵ We considered the possibility that this result might be an artifact of greater volubility on the part of the persuader. Strodtbeck found a positive relationship between talking-time and winning a decision (F. L. Strodtbeck, "Husband-Wife Interaction over Revealed Differences," *American Sociological Review*, 1951, Vol. 16, pp. 468-473). In the present study, however, mean number of words uttered by persuaders was 851.0, while mean number uttered by persuadees was 737.4. This difference is statistically insignificant ($p > .30$). In any event, controlling for number of words spoken does not alter the finding.

Figure 1 allows us to view the expression of confidence over time. Mean vectors for persuaders and persuadees are plotted by thirds of the total number of interactions. The figure indicates that as early as the first third of the discussion the persuader has a vector nearly double that of the persuadee. Neither vector changes substantially during the middle third of the discussion and, during the last third, both diminish in magnitude. Figure 1 thus supports a causal interpretation of the expressed confidence finding.




FIGURE 1. EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE OVER TIME FOR PERSUADERS AND PERSUADEES

Let us now turn to qualitative evaluation of the early portion of discussions. In the one jury in which the persuader spoke first, she began by stating her position and, in so doing, used a word indicating confidence. In 10 of the 11 juries, the person who was to become the persuadee spoke first. In 7 of these 10 cases, the persuadee manifested doubt by asking the position of the person who was to become the persuader. In 7 of the 11 juries, the persuadee first used

tude of the persuader's vector over time, but not with respect to that of the persuadee. If persuasion is caused by manifest ability, one might expect the magnitude of the persuadee's vector to decrease with time. A similar expectation holds if persuasion is caused by expressed confidence.

a word indicating doubt; in 8 of the 11 juries the persuader spoke the first word indicating confidence. In none of the juries did both the persuadee speak the first word indicating confidence and the persuader speak the first word indicating doubt. As early as the first interaction, the mean vector of persuasion for persuaders was 2.09 while the mean vector for persuadees was 0.55. Neither persuader nor persuadee had articulated a coherent argument for her position until the third interaction, by which time the cumulative mean vector for persuaders was 3.55 and, for persuadees, 1.09. The arguments, variations of the particular legal analysis each *S* had read, were of roughly equal force. These various data, then, corroborate a causal view of the role of expressed confidence.

EVALUATION OF PREDISCUSSION VARIABLES

We have considered leading variables manifested *during* discussion which may explain how the persuader changed the verdict of the persuadee. We now turn to a consideration of prediscussion variables.

For any prediscussion variable, two questions must be asked: (a) Is there evidence that it causes persuasion; (b) If so, does the variable act via expressed confidence or independently of it? If the variable does cause persuasion but acts via expressed confidence, then its theoretical status in no way vitiates the expressed confidence hypothesis. Only if it causes persuasion independently of expressed confidence can one ask whether the expressed confidence hypothesis is thereby disproved or whether expressed confidence is reduced to one of two co-acting causes.¹⁷

In the present study some potential prediscussion causes of persuasion are ruled out since *Ss* were paired along several dimensions. Certain other variables may be deemed of unlikely relevance on grounds of inherent implausibility. Evidence is presented here for two prediscussion variables potentially related to persuasion directly, or indirectly via expressed confidence.

Differential prediscussion conviction. Perhaps persuasion of one *S* by the other is a function of prediscussion conviction (i.e. the intensity of *S's* belief in his prediscussion verdict as measured by % confidence in verdict).

In 4 juries, the persuadee had the greater prediscussion conviction. In 7 juries, the persuader had the greater prediscussion conviction. For all persuaders, prediscussion conviction was 80.91 per cent; for persuadees, prediscussion conviction was 66.36 per cent. Ap-

¹⁷ For a much more extensive discussion of the background of these methodological points, see Blalock, *op. cit.*

plying a *t*-test to paired scores, we obtained an insignificant difference ($p > .15$). Prediscussion conviction does not predict persuasion.

We also consider whether prediscussion conviction correlates with vectors of persuasion. To test this possibility, we computed expressed confidence as a function of differences in prediscussion conviction. Within paired Ss, those who had higher prediscussion conviction had a mean vector of 23.45, while those with relatively low prediscussion conviction had a mean vector of 19.64. A *t*-test of paired scores yielded an insignificant difference ($p > .50$). Surprisingly, expressed confidence is not related to prediscussion conviction.

Differential intelligence. Can persuasion be explained in terms of intelligence? A study carried out by Johnson and London, which essentially replicated the present one, revealed a significant difference in expressed confidence between persuaders and persuadees but insignificant differences in the other variables considered in the present study.¹⁸ Johnson and London's Ss were paired by sex, age, height, weight, and birth order. After the study, data on the Educational Testing Service's Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) were obtained, and the scores were used to test possible differences in intelligence between persuaders and persuadees. Separate examination of the verbal and mathematical subtests of the SAT revealed insignificant differences ($p > .50$ and $> .40$ respectively). The relation between SAT and vector of persuasion was also trivial.

CONCLUSION

In this study, the persuasion of one S by another was found to be unrelated to a number of prediscussion and discussion variables. The former included initial conviction and intelligence. The latter included persuasiveness of the two sides of the issue, ability of Ss to argue cogently, and volubility. The single significant behavioral difference between persuaders and persuadees was in the expression of confidence. These points of evidence, then, make it reasonable to conclude that expressed confidence leads to persuasion.

Assuming the validity of the expressed confidence notion, what prediscussion characteristics of the individual account for it? Two obvious possibilities, initial conviction and intelligence, are unre-

¹⁸ R. Johnson and H. London, "Perceived Confidence, Expressed Confidence, and the Resolution of Disagreement," paper presented at the meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 1968, Boston, Massachusetts. It is perhaps of special interest to note that prediscussion conviction, which, in the present study, showed a tendency toward significance, revealed no such tendency ($p > .50$) in the Johnson and London study.

lated. Yet the expression of confidence must have a cause. The literature suggests hypotheses,¹⁹ but the question is essentially open.

A separate question is the mechanism by which expressed confidence persuades. Especially likely is the possibility that Ss use expressed confidence as a basis for attributing certain persuasive characteristics to each other. In fact, evidence that this is the case has been presented elsewhere.²⁰

The unusual characteristic of the present study, which has made a "correlational strategy" appropriate, is that we began with an unmanipulated situation and asked: What caused the outcome of *this* situation? More typically, in experimentally oriented social psychological research, one begins with a hypothesis and searches for a situation appropriate for its test. Under such circumstances, manipulation of the independent variable remains the research strategy of choice. Indeed, the jury method can itself be adapted to this latter sort of study.

Given our approach, the question may be raised whether there is a plausible hypothesis beyond those we have eliminated. The possibility that one exists does not invalidate the present findings. Any alternative hypothesis must be specified and shown to have efficacy. Further work may reveal explanations we have overlooked, but this can occur in "manipulational" studies too.²¹

As a final point, we suggest that the methods we have introduced have obvious implications for examination of the *process* of persuasion during discussion. Kelley and Thibaut²² have noted the lack of appropriate methodology for analyzing the communication and influence process. Figure 1, showing the magnitude of the vector of persuasion over time, indicates the relevance of this study for the kind of analysis envisaged by these investigators.

¹⁹ C. I. Hovland and I. L. Janis, eds., *Personality and Persuasibility*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1959, ch. 5.

²⁰ Johnson and London, *op. cit.*

²¹ Cf. D. T. Campbell and H. L. Ross, "The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding," *Law and Society Review*, 1968, Vol. 3, p. 53.

²² H. H. Kelley and J. Thibaut, "Experimental Studies of Group Problem Solving and Process," in G. Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. II, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1954, p. 780.